Provably secure quantum resistance two-server password-authenticated key exchange protocol

Anqi YIN; Yuanbo GUO; Ding WANG; Tongzhou QU; Lin CHEN

doi:10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2022052

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Provably secure quantum resistance two-server password-authenticated key exchange protocol

Papers | 更新时间：2024-06-05

- Provably secure quantum resistance two-server password-authenticated key exchange protocol
- Journal on Communications Vol. 43, Issue 3, Pages: 14-29(2022)
- 作者机构：
  
  1. 信息工程大学密码工程学院，河南郑州 450001
  2. 南开大学网络空间安全学院，天津 300350
  3. 南开大学天津市网络与数据安全技术重点实验室，天津 300350
- 作者简介：
- 基金信息：
  
  The National Natural Science Foundation of China(61501515)
- DOI：10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2022052
  CLC： TN918.1
- Online First：2022-03，
  
  Published：25 March 2022
- 稿件说明：
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Anqi YIN, Yuanbo GUO, Ding WANG, et al. Provably secure quantum resistance two-server password-authenticated key exchange protocol[J]. Journal on Communications, 2022, 43(3): 14-29.
DOI：

Anqi YIN, Yuanbo GUO, Ding WANG, et al. Provably secure quantum resistance two-server password-authenticated key exchange protocol[J]. Journal on Communications, 2022, 43(3): 14-29. DOI： 10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2022052.

摘要

针对基于格的单服务器口令认证密钥交换（PAKE）协议不能抵抗服务器泄露攻击，而目前基于格的多服务器 PAKE 协议的执行效率较低且不适用于两服务器场景的问题，利用带误差学习（LWE），提出了格上第一个非适应性两方平滑投影哈希函数（SPHF），具备不可区分适应性选择密文攻击（IND-CCA2）的安全性，并约束了所基于的公钥加密（PKE）方案中相关参数的大小。基于此，分别针对被动和主动敌手的攻击，提出了相应的格上可证明安全的两服务器PAKE协议。所提出的2个协议可抵御量子攻击且实现了唯口令设置，也不需要使用签名/验签、全同态加密、秘密共享等昂贵密码原语来保证安全性，被动敌手攻击下的协议还避免了零知识证明的使用。此外，在标准模型下，对所提出的2个协议进行了严格的安全性证明。实验结果表明，所提出的两方SPHF和两服务器PAKE协议的执行效率较高。

Abstract

Aiming at the problem that the lattice-based single-sever password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols are not resistant to server compromise attack

while the existing lattice-based multi-server PAKE protocols are inefficient and incompatible with two-server scenarios.The first lattice-based two-party smooth projective hash function (SPHF) was proposed by utilizing the learning with errors (LWE)

which was indistinguishability under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack(IND-CCA2) secure.The parameters of the based public key encryption (PKE) scheme were also identified.On this basis

pertinent two-server PAKE protocols from lattices were designed countering both passive and active attackers.The two quantum resistance protocols were able to achieve password-only settings and the expensive cryptographic primitives were not used

including signature/verification

fully homomorphic encryption and secret sharing.The utilization of zero knowledge proofs were avoided by the protocol under the passive attackers.In the standard model

rigorous security proofs were provided for the two proposed protocols.Experimental results show that the proposed SPHF and PAKE protocols exhibit higher execution efficiency.

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references

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