Fair and rational delegation of computation in the universally composable framework

Youliang TIAN; Xiaoxia JIANG

doi:10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2021126

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Fair and rational delegation of computation in the universally composable framework

Papers | 更新时间：2024-06-05

- Fair and rational delegation of computation in the universally composable framework
- Journal on Communications Vol. 42, Issue 9, Pages: 106-119(2021)
- 作者机构：
  
  1. 贵州大学计算机科学与技术学院，贵州贵阳 550025
  2. 贵州大学省部共建公共大数据国家重点实验室（筹），贵州贵阳 550025
  3. 贵州大学密码学与数据安全研究所，贵州贵阳 550025
- 作者简介：
- 基金信息：
  
  The National Natural Science Foundation of China(U1836205);The National Natural Science Foundation of China(61662009);The National Natural Science Foundation of China(61772008);The Science and Technology Major Support Program of Guizhou Province(20183001);Guizhou Provincial Science and Technology Plan Project([2019]1098);The Project of HighLevel Innovative Talents of Guizhou Province([2020]6008);The Project of Innovative Group in Guizhou Education Department([2013]09);Science and Technology Program of Guiyang([2021]1-5)
- DOI：10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2021126
  CLC： TN92
- Online First：2021-09，
  
  Published：25 September 2021
- 稿件说明：
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Youliang TIAN, Xiaoxia JIANG. Fair and rational delegation of computation in the universally composable framework[J]. Journal on Communications, 2021, 42(9): 106-119.
DOI：

Youliang TIAN, Xiaoxia JIANG. Fair and rational delegation of computation in the universally composable framework[J]. Journal on Communications, 2021, 42(9): 106-119. DOI： 10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2021126.

摘要

为实现理性委托计算中的经济与信誉公平性，基于密码学的区块链模型提出了通用可组合（UC）框架下的公平理性委托计算方案。首先，结合直接信誉和间接信誉构建关于委托方与计算方的双向信誉激励模型。其次，基于博弈论构建具有完美信息的理性委托计算动态博弈模型，分析得到唯一子博弈纳什均衡。再次，根据理性委托计算场景中的可验证性安全需求、参与者理性决策需求、经济与信誉公平需求以及敌手模型，基于通用可组合理论提出公平理性委托计算理想函数。最后，结合简洁承诺证明和智能合约提出了可安全实现理想函数的公平理性委托计算协议。协议分析证明，所提协议满足UC安全性。

Abstract

To realize the economic and reputation fairness in rational delegation of computation

a fair and rational delegation of computation scheme based on blockchain model of cryptography in the universally composable (UC) framework was proposed.Firstly

a bidirectional reputation incentive model between the delegator and the calculator was presented by combining direct reputation and indirect reputation.Secondly

a dynamic game model with perfect information for fair and rational delegation of computation was constructed based on game theory

and a unique sub-game Nash equilibrium was further obtained.In addition

by analyzing the requirements for verifiability

rational decision of players

economic and reputation fairness

as well as adversary model

the ideal functionality for fair and rational delegation of computation was proposed.Finally

a fair and rational delegation of computation protocol by combining succinct commit-and-prove and smart contract was proposed to securely realize the ideal functionality.The security analysis shows that the proposed protocol satisfies UC security.

关键词

Keywords

references

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