Block-based fair payment scheme under delegation computation

Ta LI; Youliang TIAN; Kang XIANG; Hongfeng GAO

doi:10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2020046

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Block-based fair payment scheme under delegation computation

Papers | 更新时间：2024-06-05

- Block-based fair payment scheme under delegation computation
- Journal on Communications Vol. 41, Issue 3, Pages: 80-90(2020)
- 作者机构：
  
  1. 贵州大学计算机科学与技术学院，贵州贵阳 550025
  2. 贵州大学密码学与数据安全研究所，贵州贵阳 550025
  3. 贵州省公共大数据重点实验室，贵州贵阳 550025
  4. 贵州大学网络与信息化管理中心，贵州贵阳 550025
- 作者简介：
- 基金信息：
  
  The National Natural Science Foundation of China(61662009);The National Natural Science Foundation of China(61772008);The National Natural Science Foundation of China(U1836205);Topnotch Talent in Science and Technology Support Program of Guizhou Province Education Department([2016]060);The Science and Technology Major Support Program of Guizhou Province(20183001);Ministry of Educatio China Mobile Research Fund Project(MCM20170401);Guizhou Provincial Science and Technology Plan Project([2017]5788);Guizhou Provincial Science and Technology Plan Project([2019]1098);Science and Technology Foundation of Guizhou Province([2008]2121)
- DOI：10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2020046
  CLC： TP393
- Online First：2020-03，
  
  Published：25 March 2020
- 稿件说明：
移动端阅览
Ta LI, Youliang TIAN, Kang XIANG, et al. Block-based fair payment scheme under delegation computation[J]. Journal on Communications, 2020, 41(3): 80-90.
DOI：

Ta LI, Youliang TIAN, Kang XIANG, et al. Block-based fair payment scheme under delegation computation[J]. Journal on Communications, 2020, 41(3): 80-90. DOI： 10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2020046.

摘要

传统委托计算中，由于参与者双方的自利行为，存在委托方抵赖和计算方不诚实计算等问题。在支付阶段，需采用第三方来保证支付的公平性，从而导致额外的开销且存在泄露参与者隐私的风险。利用博弈论分析了支付过程中双方达到纳什均衡解，提出一种基于比特币时间承诺的公平支付协议。首先，利用比特币时间承诺技术保证参与者支付的公平性；其次，利用区块链去中心化的特性来取代第三方服务保护各方隐私且实现责任溯源；最后从安全性和正确性对方案进行分析，证明了参与者在支付过程中诚实选择行为策略。所提方案不仅解决了传统委托计算中公平支付的难题而且保护了参与方的隐私。

Abstract

In the traditional delegation computation

due to the self-interested behavior of both participants

there were some problems such as the denial of the principal and the dishonest calculation by the computing party.In the payment phase

a third party was required to ensure the fairness of the payment

which led to extra costs and risks of disclosure of participants' privacy.Game theory was used to analyze the Nash equilibrium solution between the two parties in the payment process

and a fair payment protocol based on time commitment of bitcoin was proposed.Firstly

the bitcoin time commitment technology was used to ensure the fairness of payment.Secondly

the decentralized feature of block chain was used to replace the third-party service to protect the privacy of all parties and realize the source of responsibility.Finally

the scheme was analyzed from the perspective of security and correctness

which proved that the participants choose behavioral strategies honestly in the payment process.The scheme proposed in this paper not only solved the problem of fair payment in traditional delegation computation

but also protected the privacy of participants.

关键词

Keywords

references

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