Analysis of provably secure on-demand source routing in MANET
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Analysis of provably secure on-demand source routing in MANET
Vol. 30, Issue 1, Pages: 38-44(2009)
作者机构:
1. 西安电子科技大学计算机学院
2. 计算机网络与信息安全教育部重点实验室
作者简介:
基金信息:
DOI:
CLC:TN929.5
Published:2009
稿件说明:
移动端阅览
MAO Li-qiang1, MA Jian-feng1, LI Xing-hua1. Analysis of provably secure on-demand source routing in MANET[J]. 2009, 30(1): 38-44.
DOI:
MAO Li-qiang1, MA Jian-feng1, LI Xing-hua1. Analysis of provably secure on-demand source routing in MANET[J]. 2009, 30(1): 38-44.DOI:
Analysis of provably secure on-demand source routing in MANET
摘要
对MANET安全按需源路由协议的一种形式化分析模型进行了深入分析
指出其中存在的合并相邻敌手节点等不合理操作以及该模型下endairA协议安全性证明过程中的错误
并给出了一种针对endairA协议的隐蔽信道攻击
表明该协议即使在其安全分析模型下也不能满足其安全目标。
Abstract
A formal model tailored to the security analysis of on-demand source routing protocols in MANET was analyzed
and the improper manipulations such as mergence of the adjacent adversarial nodes in the model and the flaw in the proof for endairA were indicated. A new hidden channel attack to endairA was presented
which shows that endairA is not provably secure even in their model.