面向隐私保护的多属性逆向频谱拍卖方案

王佳琪; 鲁宁; 程庆丰; 巫朝霞; 史闻博

doi:10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2020121

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面向隐私保护的多属性逆向频谱拍卖方案

学术论文 | 更新时间：2024-06-05

- 面向隐私保护的多属性逆向频谱拍卖方案
- Privacy-preserving multi-attribute reverse spectrum auction scheme
- 通信学报 2020年41卷第9期页码：77-91
- 作者机构：
  
  1. 东北大学计算机科学与工程学院，辽宁沈阳 110819
  2. 西安电子科技大学计算机科学与技术学院，陕西西安 710126
  3. 信息工程大学四院，河南郑州 450001
  4. 数学工程与先进计算国家重点实验室，河南郑州 450001
  5. 新疆财经大学应用数学学院，新疆乌鲁木齐 830012
  6. 东北大学秦皇岛分校计算机与通信工程学院，河北秦皇岛 066004
- 作者简介：
  
  [ "王佳琪（1989- ），女，吉林长春人，东北大学博士生，主要研究方向为网络信息安全、电子拍卖安全、频谱拍卖安全" ]
  [ "鲁宁（1984- ），男，内蒙古包头人，博士，东北大学副教授，主要研究方向为网络安全" ]
  [ "程庆丰（1979- ），男，辽宁朝阳人，博士，信息工程大学副教授，主要研究方向为公钥密码学、密码协议" ]
  [ "巫朝霞（1975- ），女，广东揭西人，博士，新疆财经大学副教授，主要研究方向为信息安全" ]
  [ "史闻博（1980- ），男，河北唐山人，博士，东北大学秦皇岛分校教授，主要研究方向为应用密码学、网络安全、信息系统安全、网络攻击与防范、信息隐藏理论与技术、物联网安全、网络对抗" ]
- 基金信息：
  
  国家自然科学基金资助项目(U1708262);国家自然科学基金资助项目(61601107);国家自然科学基金资助项目(61941205);国家自然科学基金资助项目(61872449);中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2019M653568);中央高校基本科研业务费基金资助项目(N2023020)
- DOI：10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2020121
  中图分类号： TP309
- 网络出版日期：2020-09，
  
  纸质出版日期：2020-09-25
- 稿件说明：
移动端阅览
王佳琪, 鲁宁, 程庆丰, 等. 面向隐私保护的多属性逆向频谱拍卖方案[J]. 通信学报, 2020,41(9):77-91.

Jiaqi WANG, Ning LU, Qingfeng CHENG, et al. Privacy-preserving multi-attribute reverse spectrum auction scheme[J]. Journal on communications, 2020, 41(9): 77-91.
王佳琪, 鲁宁, 程庆丰, 等. 面向隐私保护的多属性逆向频谱拍卖方案[J]. 通信学报, 2020,41(9):77-91. DOI： 10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2020121.

Jiaqi WANG, Ning LU, Qingfeng CHENG, et al. Privacy-preserving multi-attribute reverse spectrum auction scheme[J]. Journal on communications, 2020, 41(9): 77-91. DOI： 10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2020121.

摘要

针对现有的逆向频谱拍卖没有考虑与频谱有关的非价格属性的问题和频谱拍卖安全问题，提出了一个面向隐私保护的多属性逆向频谱拍卖方案。首先，将含有频谱价格、与频谱有关的非价格正向属性值作为频谱竞标人的竞标方案并执行拍卖判断频谱赢家。其次，为确保频谱拍卖的安全性，方案利用 Paillier 门限机制引入一组拍卖人的分治集中式频谱拍卖服务器代替传统单一的第三方代理机构，防止频谱拍卖人与频谱竞标人的“合作欺诈”。所提方案还引入匿名化技术、不经意传输技术的密码学工具，确保频谱拍卖的安全特性，使频谱拍卖安全地执行。对所提方案的安全协议进行安全分析表明，协议具有较强的安全性。对协议进行性能评估，实验结果表明，所提方案在计算开销上优于可应用在频谱拍卖场景下的多属性逆向拍卖安全方案。

Abstract

Aiming the problem that the existing reverse spectrum auctions do not take the non-price attribute of spectrum into account and the security of spectrum auction

a privacy-preserving multi-attribute reverse spectrum auction was proposed.Firstly

price and non-price positive attributes of spectrum were considered as the bidding scheme of bidders and auctions was performed to judge spectrum winners.Secondly

to ensure the security of the spectrum auction

the Paillier threshold system was used to introduce a group of spectrum auction servers of auctioneers to replace the traditional single third-party agency

which could prevent the fraud collusion between spectrum auctioneers and bidders.The cryptography tools such as the anonymization technology and oblivious transfer were introduced to achieve the secure features

which could make the spectrum auction performed securely.The security analysis shows that the security protocol has strong security.The performance of the protocol is also evaluated

and experimental results show that the security scheme is superior to the multi-attribute reverse auction security scheme that can be applied in the spectrum auction scenario in terms of computational overhead.

关键词

Keywords

references

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