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1. 中国科学院信息工程研究所,北京 100093
2. 中国科学院大学网络空间安全学院,北京 100049
[ "刘奇旭(1984- ),男,江苏徐州人,博士,中国科学院信息工程研究所副研究员,中国科学院大学副教授,主要研究方向为网络攻防技术、网络安全评测。" ]
[ "邱凯丽(1996- ),女,土家族,湖南张家界人,中国科学院大学硕士生,主要研究方向为网络攻防技术。" ]
[ "王乙文(1996- ),男,浙江湖州人,中国科学院大学硕士生,主要研究方向为网络攻防技术。" ]
[ "陈艳辉(1996- ),男,山东潍坊人,中国科学院大学博士生,主要研究方向为网络攻防技术。" ]
[ "陈浪平(1995- ),男,浙江绍兴人,中国科学院大学硕士生,主要研究方向为网络攻防技术。" ]
[ "刘潮歌(1986- ),男,吉林长春人,博士,中国科学院信息工程研究所助理研究员,中国科学院大学讲师,主要研究方向为网络攻击追踪溯源、Web安全和网络欺骗。" ]
网络出版日期:2019-06,
纸质出版日期:2019-06-25
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刘奇旭, 邱凯丽, 王乙文, 等. 面向OAuth2.0授权服务API的账号劫持攻击威胁检测[J]. 通信学报, 2019,40(6):40-50.
Qixu LIU, Kaili QIU, Yiwen WANG, et al. Account hijacking threat attack detection for OAuth2.0 authorization API[J]. Journal on communications, 2019, 40(6): 40-50.
刘奇旭, 邱凯丽, 王乙文, 等. 面向OAuth2.0授权服务API的账号劫持攻击威胁检测[J]. 通信学报, 2019,40(6):40-50. DOI: 10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2019144.
Qixu LIU, Kaili QIU, Yiwen WANG, et al. Account hijacking threat attack detection for OAuth2.0 authorization API[J]. Journal on communications, 2019, 40(6): 40-50. DOI: 10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2019144.
OAuth2.0授权协议在简化用户登录第三方应用的同时,也存在泄露用户隐私数据的风险,甚至引发用户账号被攻击劫持。通过分析 OAuth2.0 协议的脆弱点,构建了围绕授权码的账号劫持攻击模型,提出了基于差异流量分析的脆弱性应用程序编程接口(API)识别方法和基于授权认证网络流量监测的账号劫持攻击验证方法,设计并实现了面向OAuth2.0授权服务API的账号劫持攻击威胁检测框架OScan。通过对Alexa排名前10 000的网站中真实部署的3 853个授权服务API进行大规模测试,发现360个存在脆弱性的API。经过进一步验证,发现了80个网站存在账号劫持攻击威胁。相较类似工具,OScan在覆盖身份提供方(IdP)全面性、检测依赖方(RP)数量和威胁检测完整性等方面均具有明显的优势。
OAuth2.0 protocol has been widely adopted to simplify user login to third-party applications
at the same time
existing risk of leaking user privacy data
what even worse
causing user accounts to be hijacked.An account hijacking attack model around authorization code was built by analyzing the vulnerabilities of the OAuth2.0 protocol.A vulnerable API identification method based on differential traffic analysis and an account hijacking verification method based on authorized authentication traffic monitoring was proposed.An account hijacking attack threat detection framework OScan for OAuth2.0 authorization API was designed and implemented.Through a large-scale detection of the 3 853 authorization APIs deployed on the Alexa top 10 000 websites
360 vulnerable APIs were discovered.The further verification showed that 80 websites were found to have threat of account hijacking attack.Compared with similar tools
OScan has significant advantages in covering the number of identity provider
the number of detected relying party
as well as the integrity of risk detection.
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