基于改进复制动态演化博弈模型的最优防御策略选取

黄健明; 张恒巍

doi:10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2018010

您当前的位置：

首页 >

文章列表页 >

基于改进复制动态演化博弈模型的最优防御策略选取

学术通信 | 更新时间：2024-06-05

- 基于改进复制动态演化博弈模型的最优防御策略选取
- Improving replicator dynamic evolutionary game model for selecting optimal defense strategies
- 通信学报 2018年39卷第1期页码：170-182
- 作者机构：
  
  1. 信息工程大学三院，河南郑州 450001
  2. 数学工程与先进计算国家重点实验室，河南郑州 450001
- 作者简介：
  
  [ "黄健明（1992-），男，湖南张家界人，信息工程大学硕士生，主要研究方向为网络安全主动防御。" ]
  [ "张恒巍（1978-），男，河南洛阳人，博士，信息工程大学副教授，主要研究方向为网络安全与攻防对抗、信息安全风险评估。" ]
- 基金信息：
  
  国家自然科学基金资助项目(61303074);国家自然科学基金资助项目(61309013);河南省科技计划基金资助项目(12210231003);河南省科技计划基金资助项目(13210231002)
- DOI：10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2018010
  中图分类号： TP390
- 网络出版日期：2018-01，
  
  纸质出版日期：2018-01-25
- 稿件说明：
移动端阅览
黄健明, 张恒巍. 基于改进复制动态演化博弈模型的最优防御策略选取[J]. 通信学报, 2018,39(1):170-182.

Jianming HUANG, Hengwei ZHANG. Improving replicator dynamic evolutionary game model for selecting optimal defense strategies[J]. Journal on communications, 2018, 39(1): 170-182.
黄健明, 张恒巍. 基于改进复制动态演化博弈模型的最优防御策略选取[J]. 通信学报, 2018,39(1):170-182. DOI： 10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2018010.

Jianming HUANG, Hengwei ZHANG. Improving replicator dynamic evolutionary game model for selecting optimal defense strategies[J]. Journal on communications, 2018, 39(1): 170-182. DOI： 10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2018010.

摘要

针对同一博弈群体之间存在策略依存性，通过引入激励系数，改进传统复制动态方程，完善复制动态速率计算方法，构建基于改进复制动态的网络攻防演化博弈模型。利用改进复制动态方程进行演化均衡求解，采用雅可比矩阵的局部稳定分析法对所求均衡点进行稳定性分析，得到不同条件下的最优防御策略。研究结果表明，同一群体的不同策略之间既存在促进作用，也存在抑制作用。通过实验仿真验证了所提模型和方法的准确性和有效性，为解决现实社会中的信息安全问题提供了新的理论支撑。

Abstract

In terms of the existence of strategy dependency in the same game group

network attack-defense evolutionary game model based on the improved replicator dynamics was constricted by introducing the intensity coefficient

which completed the method of calculating replicator dynamic rate.The improved replicator dynamic equation was adopted to solve the evolutionary equilibrium for the situation that both attack and defense have two optional strategies.The stability of the equilibrium points was analyzed by the local stability analysis method of Jacobian matrix

and the optimal defense strategies were obtained under different conditions.The results show that the strategy dependency between the players in the same group has a certain influence on the evolution of the game

both the incentive and the inhibition.Finally

the accuracy and validity of the model and method are verified by the experimental simulation

which provides a new theoretical support for solving the information security problems in the real.

关键词

Keywords

references

ROY S , ELLIS C , SHIVA S , et al . A survey of game theory as applie ed to network se ecurity [C ] // 43rd Hawaii Internationall Conference on Sy ystem Sciencess , 2010 : 1 - 10 .

LIANG X , XIAO Y . Game ttheory for networrk security [J ] . IEEE Communicattions Surveys ＆ Tuutorials , 2013 , 15 ( 1) ): 472 - 486 .

VIDUTO V , HUANG W , MAPLE C . Toward op ttimal multi-objectiv ve models of neetwork security:suurvey [C ] // 2011 17tth International Co onference on Auutomation ＆ Compputing . 2011 : 6 - 11 .

GORDON L , LOEB M , LUC YSHYN W , et al . 2016 CSI/FBI computer crime aand security survey y [C ] // 2016 Computter Security Institutte . 2016 : 48 - 64 .

SERRA E , JAJODIA S , PUGLIIESE A , et al . Paretto-optimal adversar rial defense off enterprise systems [J ] . ACM Transacction on Informatioon＆ System Seecurity , 2015 , 17 ( 3 ): 11 .

RICHARD L , JOSHUA W . Ana alysis and results off the DARPA off-lin ne intrusion deteection evaluation [C ] // 17th Internationnal Workshop on Recent Advancees in Intrusion Detecction . 2015 : 162 - 1822 .

EISENSTADT E , MOSHAIOV A , AVIGAD G . The e competing travellinng salespersons pproblem under multii-criteria [C ] // 2016 14th International Co onference on Parrallel Problem Solviinng from Nature . 2016 : 463 - 472 .

GORDON L , LOEB M . Budggeting process for information securiity expenditures [J ] . Communication ns of the ACM , 2016 , 51 ( 8 ): 395 - 406 .

WHITE J , PARK J S , KAMHOUA C A , et al . Game theoretic attac ck analysis in oonline social network (OSN) services [C ] // 2016 Intern national Conferrence on Social Nettworks Technologyy . 2016 : 1012 - 1019 .

OCEVICIC H , NENADIC K , SOLIC K . Game thheory:active defen nse model and method [J ] . IEEE Infformation and Network Security , 2016 , 51 ( 8 ): 395 - 4006 .

LYE K W , WING J . Game straategies in networkk security [J ] . Intern national Journaal of Information Seecurity , 2005 , 4 ( 1/22 ): 71 - 86 .

林旺群 , 王慧 , 刘家红 . 基于非合作动态博弈的网络安全主动防御技术研究 [J ] . 计算机研究与发展 , 2013 , 48 ( 2 ): 3006 - 316 .

LIN W Q , WANG H , LIU J H . Research on active defense technology in network securrity based on non-co ooperative dynamic game theory [J ] . Jou urnal of Compuuter Research and De evelopment , 2013 , 488 ( 2 ): 306 - 316 .

姜伟 , 方滨兴 , 田志宏 . 基于攻防随机博弈模型的防御策略选取研究 [J ] . 计算机研究与发展 , 2013 , 47 ( 10 ): 1714 - 1723 .

JIANG W , FANG B X , TIAN Z H . Research on d defense strategies sselection basedd on attack-defensee stochastic game model [J ] . Journal of Computer Reesearch and Develo opment , 2013 , 47 ( 1 0 ): 1714 - 1723 .

张恒巍 , 余定坤 , 韩继红 , 等 . .基于攻防信号博弈模型的防御策略选取方法 [J ] . .通信学报 , 2016 , 37 ( 5 ): 39 - 49 .

ZHANG H W , YU D K , HA N J H , et al . Defennse policies selectioon method based on attack-defensse signaling game model [J ] . Journal o on Communicattions , 2016 , 37 ( 5 ): 339 - 49 .

王长春 , 程晓航 , 朱永文 , 等 . 计算机网络对抗行动策略的Marko ov博弈模型 [J ] . .系统工程理论与实践 , 2014 , 34 ( 9 ): 2402 - 2410 .

WANG C C , CHENG X H , ZHU Y W , et al . A Ma arkov game model of computer nettwork operation [J ] . .Systems Enginee rring -Theory ＆ Pra actice , 2014 , 344 ( 9 ): 2402 - 2410 .

MARTIN A N . Breakking the symmetry y between interacti ion and replaccement in evolutioonary dynamics onn graphs [J ] . Physiccal Review Lettters , 2016 ( 23 ): 24 - 333 .

LI P , DUAN H B . Rob bustness of cooperaation on scale-free n networks in the evolutionary prisooner’s dilemma game [J ] . A Letters J Journal Explorring the Frontiers of Physics , 2014 ( 1005 ): 12 - 19 .

孙薇 . 基于演化博弈论的信息安全攻防问题研究 [J ] . 情报科学 , 2015 ( 9 ): 1408 - 1412 .

SUN W . Research on atttack and deference i in information secur rity based on evollutionary game [J ] . Innformation Science , 2015 ( 9 ): 1408 - 1412 .

朱建明 , 宋彪 , 黄启发 . 基于系统动力学的网络安全攻防演化博弈模型 [J ] . 通信学报 , 2014 , 35 ( 1 ): 54 - 61 .

ZHU J M , SONG B , , HUANG Q F . Evolution game moodel of offensse-defense for nettwork security based on system dyynamics [J ] . Jourrnal on Communicaations , 2014 , 35 ( 1 ): 54 - 61 .

黄健明 , 张恒巍 , 王晋东 , 等 . 基于攻防演化博弈模型的防御策略选取方法 [J ] . 通信学报 , 2017 , 38 ( 1 ): 1668 - 176 .

HUANG J M , ZHANG H W , WANG J D , et al . Defense sttrategies selectiion based on attacck-defense evolutioonary game model [J ] . Journal on Communications , 2017 , 38 ( 1 ): 168 - 1776 .

SHEN S G , HUANG L J , FAN E , et al . Trust dynamics in n WSN:an evol lutionary game-theeoretic approach [J ] . Journal of Sens sors , 2016 , 32 ( 44 ): 34 - 43 .

LI U F M , DING Y S . Dynamics analysis of evolutionary g game-based trus t computing for P2P networks [J ] . Application Researc ch of Computeers , 2016 , 33 ( 8 ): 2460 - 2463 .

FUDENBERG D , LE VINE D . Learningg in games [J ] . Euroopean Economic Review , 1998 , 442 ( 3-5 ): 631 - 639 .

GILBOA I , MATSUI A . Social stability aand equilibrium [J ] . Econometricaa , 1991 , 59 ( 3 ): 859 - 867 .

DREW F , JEAN T . Ga ame theory [M ] . Booston : Massachusetttes Institute of Technology Press , 2012 .

BERGER U , HOFBA UER J . Irrational beehavior in the Bro wn-von Neumannn-Nash dynamics [J ] . Games and Econoomic Behavior , 2006 , 56 ( 1 ): 1 - 6 .

SMIITH M J . Stabilityy of a dynamic moodel of traffic assi gnment-An appllication of a methood of Lyapunov [J ] . Transportation Scie ence , 1984 , 18 ( 33 ): 245 - 252 .

GU O H , WANG X W , , CHENG H , et al . A routing defense mechanism usinng evolutionary ga me theory for delay y tolerant networks[ [J ] . Applied Sofftt Computing , 2016 ( 38 ): 469 - 476 .

TAYLOR P D , JONK ER L B . Evolutionaary stable strategie s and game dynnamics [J ] . Mathemaatical Biosciences , 1978 , 40 ( 1/2 ): 145 - 156 .

LEE W K , FAN W , M IILLER M , et al . Toward cost-sensitive modeling for intruusion detection and response [J ] . Journaal of Computer Sec curity , 2002 , 10 ( 1-2 ): 5 - 22 .

BO RKOVSKY R N , DORASZELSKI U , KRYUKOV Y . A user’ s guid de to solving dyna amic stochastic games using the ho motopy methodd [J ] . Operation Ressearch , 2015 , 58 ( 4 ): 1116 - 1132 .

浏览量

2063

下载量

CSCD

文章被引用时，请邮件提醒。

提交

工具集

关联资源

暂无数据