浏览全部资源
扫码关注微信
解放军信息工程大学三院,河南 郑州 450004
[ "谷文(1992-),男,湖南耒阳人,解放军信息工程大学硕士生,主要研究方向为安全协议形式化分析与自动化验证。" ]
[ "韩继红(1966-),女,山西定襄人,博士,解放军信息工程大学教授、博士生导师,主要研究方向为网络与信息安全、安全协议形式化分析与自动化验证。" ]
[ "袁霖(1981-),男,河南商丘人,博士,解放军信息工程大学副教授,主要研究方向为安全协议形式化分析与自动化验证、软件可信性分析。" ]
网络出版日期:2017-10,
纸质出版日期:2017-10-25
移动端阅览
谷文, 韩继红, 袁霖. SSMCI:以攻击者为中心的安全协议验证机制[J]. 通信学报, 2017,38(10):175-188.
Wen GU, Ji-hong HAN, Lin YUAN. SSMCI:verification mechanism for security protocols centered on the attacker[J]. Journal on communications, 2017, 38(10): 175-188.
谷文, 韩继红, 袁霖. SSMCI:以攻击者为中心的安全协议验证机制[J]. 通信学报, 2017,38(10):175-188. DOI: 10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2017208.
Wen GU, Ji-hong HAN, Lin YUAN. SSMCI:verification mechanism for security protocols centered on the attacker[J]. Journal on communications, 2017, 38(10): 175-188. DOI: 10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2017208.
提出一种能对安全协议进行分析的自动化验证机制。提出需求的概念,认为需求是攻击者未知但又对攻击者合成目标项至关重要的知识集合,并建立了以需求为中心的攻击者模型;设计一种以攻击者为中心的状态搜索方式,按需添加协议会话实例,为避免新增协议会话实例引起攻击者推理出现时序矛盾,引入回溯机制以确保状态转移过程中攻击者知识能正确增长。实验表明,该系统能正确验证协议的安全性,状态空间数目略优于Scyther工具。
A automatic verification mechanism for security protocols analysis was proposed.The attacker model was proposed and the concept of ‘need’ was defined
a knowledge set which was necessary for the attacker to compose a target message term but unknown to the attacker.The attacker model was established as needed.The mechanism centered on the attacker was designed
in which whether add a protocol session was determined by the attacker.This might cause contradiction in time sequence
so some back-track algorithm was adopted to solve this contradiction.Experiments show that the system can verify the security of the protocol
and the number of state space is slightly better than the Scyther tool.
GUTTMAN J D . Establishing and preserving protocol security goals [J ] . Journal of Computer Security , 2014 , 22 ( 2 ): 203 - 267 .
ARMANDO A , CARBONE R , COMPAGNA L . SATMC:a SAT-based model checker for security protocols,business processes,and security APIs [J ] . International Journal on Software Tools for Technology Transfer , 2016 , 18 ( 2 ): 187 - 204 .
CREMERS C , MANW S . Operational semantics and verification of security protocols [M ] . Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg , 2012 : 78 - 103 .
CREMERS C , LAFOURCADE P , NADEAU P . Comparing state spaces in automatic security protocol analysis [M ] . Formal to Practical Security . Springer Berlin Heidelberg , 2009 : 70 - 94 .
DAIVD B , SEBASTIAN M , LUCA V . OFMC:a symbolic model checker for security protocols [J ] . International Journal of Information Security , 2005 , 4 ( 3 ): 181 - 208 .
ARMANDO A , CARBONE R , COMPAGNA L . SATMC:a SAT-based model checker for security protocols,business processes,and security APIs [J ] . International Journal on Software Tools for Technology Transfer , 2016 , 18 ( 2 ): 187 - 204 .
LUCA V . Automated security protocol analysis with the AVISPA tool [J ] . Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science , 2006 , 155 : 61 - 86 .
CHEVAL V , CORTIER V . Timing attacks in security protocols:symbolic framework and proof techniques [M ] // Principles of Security and Trust,Springer Berlin Heidelberg , 2015 : 280 - 299 .
STYLIANOS B , PANAGIOTIS K , ANDREW P . An intruder model with message inspection for model checking security protocols [J ] . Computers & Security , 2010 , 29 ( 1 ): 16 - 34 .
BLANCHET B . Automatic verification of security protocols in the symbolic model:the verifier proverif [M ] . Foundations of Security Analysis and Design VII . Springer International Publishing,2014 , 8604 : 54 - 87 .
PINAZO S S . Advanced features in protocol verification:theory,properties,and efficiency in maude-NPA [J ] . Escobar Román Santiago , 2015 .
CHOTHIA T , SMYTH B , STAITE C . Automatically checking commitment protocols in ProVerif without false attacks [C ] // International Conference on Principles of Security and Trust.Springer Berlin Heidelberg . 2015 : 137 - 155 .
SIMON M . Advanced automatic security protocol verification [D ] . ETH ZURICH , 2013 : 99 - 116 .
MEIER S , SCHMIDT B , CREMERS C . The TAMRIN prover for the symbolic analysis of security protocols [C ] // The 25th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification (CAV'13) . 2013 : 696 - 701 .
BASIN D , CREMERS C . Modeling and analyzing security in the presence of compromising adversaries [C ] // The 15th European Conference on Research in Computer Security,Dimitris Gritzalis,2010 , 6345 : 340 - 356 .
0
浏览量
861
下载量
0
CSCD
关联资源
相关文章
相关作者
相关机构