基于攻防演化博弈模型的防御策略选取方法

黄健明; 张恒巍; 王晋东; 黄世锐

doi:10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2017019

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基于攻防演化博弈模型的防御策略选取方法

学术通信 | 更新时间：2024-06-05

- 基于攻防演化博弈模型的防御策略选取方法
- Defense strategies selection based on attack-defense evolutionary game model
- 通信学报 2017年38卷第1期页码：168-176
- 作者机构：
  
  1. 信息工程大学，河南郑州 450001
  2. 数学工程与先进计算国家重点实验室，河南郑州 450001
- 作者简介：
  
  [ "黄健明（1992-），男，湖南张家界人，信息工程大学硕士生，主要研究方向为网络安全主动防御。" ]
  [ "张恒巍（1978-），男，河南洛阳人，博士，信息工程大学讲师，主要研究方向为网络安全行为分析、信息安全风险评估。" ]
  [ "王晋东（1966-），男，山西洪桐人，信息工程大学教授，主要研究方向为网络与信息安全、云资源管理。" ]
  [ "黄世锐（1994-），男，广东汕头人，信息工程大学硕士生，主要研究方向为网络安全预警与预测。" ]
- 基金信息：
  
  国家自然科学基金资助项目(61303074);国家自然科学基金资助项目(61309013);河南省科技计划基金资助项目(12210231003);河南省科技计划基金资助项目(13210231002)
- DOI：10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2017019
  中图分类号： TP390
- 网络出版日期：2017-01，
  
  纸质出版日期：2017-01-25
- 稿件说明：
移动端阅览
黄健明, 张恒巍, 王晋东, 等. 基于攻防演化博弈模型的防御策略选取方法[J]. 通信学报, 2017,38(1):168-176.

Jian-ming HUANG, Heng-wei ZHANG, Jin-dong WANG, et al. Defense strategies selection based on attack-defense evolutionary game model[J]. Journal on communications, 2017, 38(1): 168-176.
黄健明, 张恒巍, 王晋东, 等. 基于攻防演化博弈模型的防御策略选取方法[J]. 通信学报, 2017,38(1):168-176. DOI： 10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2017019.

Jian-ming HUANG, Heng-wei ZHANG, Jin-dong WANG, et al. Defense strategies selection based on attack-defense evolutionary game model[J]. Journal on communications, 2017, 38(1): 168-176. DOI： 10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2017019.

摘要

当前运用博弈理论的网络安全研究方法大多采用完全理性假设，与实际情况并不相符。从网络攻防对抗的有限理性约束出发，基于非合作演化博弈理论，构建攻防演化博弈模型，提出演化稳定均衡的求解方法。在分析演化稳定策略的基础上，设计了最优防御策略选取算法。通过仿真实验验证了所提模型和方法的有效性，并且分析、总结了有限理性限制下攻防行为的演化规律。

Abstract

Due to that the current network security researches based on game theory mostly use the completely rationality assumption

which is not consistent with the facts.Under the bounded rationality constraint of network attack-defense

attack-defense evolutionary game model and a method to solve evolutionary stable equilibrium based on the non-cooperative evolutionary game theory was proposed.The optimal defense strategy selection algorithm was designed based on the analysis of the evolutionary stable strategy.The effectiveness of the model and method proposed is verified by simulation results

through which some evolution conclusions of offensive behavior on the premise of limited rationality were drawn.

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references

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