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1. 北京理工大学 北京市软件安全工程技术重点实验室,北京 100081
2. Key Laboratory of IDT Application Technology of Universities in Yunnam Province,Yunnam Minzu University,Kunming 650500,China
3. 中国科学院 信息工程研究所 信息安全国家重点实验室,北京 100093
[ "田东海(1984-),男,湖南长沙人,博士,北京理工大学讲师,主要研究方向为操作系统安全、虚拟化技术、智能终端安全等。" ]
[ "陈君华[通信作者](1975-),男,四川仪陇人,博士,云南民族大学副教授,主要研究方向为物联网应用和信息安全等。E-mail:chenjunhuabj@163.com。" ]
[ "贾晓启(1982-),男,北京人,博士,中国科学院信息工程研究所副研究员,主要研究方向为操作系统安全、云计算安全和虚拟化技术等。" ]
[ "胡昌振(1967-),男,湖北汉川人,博士,北京理工大学教授,主要研究方向为网络安全、软件安全和模式识别等。" ]
网络出版日期:2015-11,
纸质出版日期:2015-11-25
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田东海, 陈君华, 贾晓启, 等. 内核完整性保护模型的设计与实现[J]. 通信学报, 2015,36(Z1):118-125.
Dong-hai TIAN, Jun-hua CHEN, Xiao-qi JIA, et al. Design and implementation of a model for OS kernel integrity protection[J]. Journal on communications, 2015, 36(Z1): 118-125.
田东海, 陈君华, 贾晓启, 等. 内核完整性保护模型的设计与实现[J]. 通信学报, 2015,36(Z1):118-125. DOI: 10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2015289.
Dong-hai TIAN, Jun-hua CHEN, Xiao-qi JIA, et al. Design and implementation of a model for OS kernel integrity protection[J]. Journal on communications, 2015, 36(Z1): 118-125. DOI: 10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2015289.
非可信内核扩展模块是对操作系统内核完整性安全的重要威胁之一,因为它们一旦被加载到内核空间,将可能任意破坏操作系统内核数据和代码完整性。针对这一问题,提出了一种基于强制访问控制对操作系统内核完整性保护的模型—MOKIP。该模型的基本思想是为内核空间中的不同实体设置不同的完整性标签,然后保证具有低完整性标签的实体不能破坏具有高完整性标签的实体。基于硬件辅助的虚拟化技术实现了原型系统,实验结果表明,本系统能够抵御各种恶意内核扩展模块的攻击,其性能开销被控制在13%以内。
Untrusted kernel extensions were considered to be a big threat to OS kernel integrity because once they were loaded into the kernel space
then they may corrupt both the OS kernel data and code at will.To address this problem
MAC-based model named MOKIP for OS kernel integrity protection was presented.The basic idea of MOKIP was to set different integrity labels for different entities in the kernel space
and then ensure that the entities with low integrity label cannot harm the entities with high integrity label.A prototype system based on the hardware assisted virtualization technology was implemented.The experimental results show that proposed system is effective at defending against various malicious kernel extension attacks within a little performance overhead which is less than 13%.
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